Political Prudence in Some Medieval Commentaries on the Sixth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics by R. LAMBERTINI
POLITICAL PRUDENCE IN SOME MEDIEVAL
COMMENTARIES ON THE SIXTH
BOOK OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
Roberto Lambertini
Università degli studi di Macerata
The modern reader might well be surprised that John Buridan devotes
so much of his commentary on the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics
to questions about the unity of prudence. One question (q. 13) considers
whether there are diﬀerent prudences, each related to some speciﬁc
moral virtue. A second question (q. 14) considers whether individual
prudence, political prudence, and prudence regulating the household
are all the same disposition. A third question (q. 15) examines the
relationship between political prudence and legislative prudence, while
a fourth (q. 17) concerns the relation between prudence, the moral
sciences discussed in Aristotle’s Ethics, Economics, and Politics, and those
in books of laws and decreta. Where Aristotle himself devotes only one
short passage to the unity of prudence (EN 1041b22–32), four out of
Buridan’s 22 questions on book 6 deal with a cluster of problems related
to this topic.
A likely explanation lies in the tradition of commenting on the Nico-
machean Ethics,1 especially at Paris. The few, entangled lines where Aris-
totle discusses the relationship between prudence and politics caused
medieval interpreters so many problems that it became customary for
the masters to raise questions at this point of their lectures. As often
happens in the history of philosophy, the problems were not solved by
so many interventions; on the contrary, questions tended to increase in
number and length. The result of such discussions is an interpretation
moving farther and farther from what we now recognize as the histori-
I would like to thank Bonnie Kent and István Bejczy for their most valuable help in
ﬁnishing the present paper, that is dedicated to my parents.
1 For an updated survey, see David A. Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian Renaissance
(ca. 1300–1650): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education (Leiden, 2002), esp. 45–
91.
224 roberto lambertini
cal Aristotle’s opinion, until it becomes almost independent. Of course,
this does not make these discussions less interesting, at least in the eyes
of medievalists.
The aim of this paper is to present some interpretations of the Aris-
totelian passage that in diﬀerent ways helped to shape the commentary
tradition. I shall focus in particular on the concept of political pru-
dence, using it as a sort of litmus test of the development of the discus-
sion.
Aristotle’s text
Let us begin with the passage in the Nicomachean Ethics that served
as a starting point for our commentators’ discussions. According to
the recensio recognita, the Latin translation that René-Antoine Gauthier
thinks was the most popular among thirteenth- and fourteenth-century
commentators,2 the passage reads:
Erit autem quaedam utique et hic architectonica. Est autem et politica
et prudencia, idem quidem habitus, esse quidem non idem ipsis. Eius
autem que circa civitatem, hec quidem ut architectonica prudencia legis
positiva; hec autem ut singularia, commune habet nomen politica; ipsa
autem activa et consiliativa. Sentencia enim operabilis; quare extrema.
Propter quod civiliter conversari hos solum dicunt. Soli enim operantur
isti quemadmodum therotemne.
Videtur autem et prudencia maxime esse que circa ipsum et unum,
et habet ipsa commune nomen prudencia. Illarum autem hec quidem
ychonomia, hec autem legis posicio, hec autem politica; et huius hec
quidem consiliativa, hec autem iudicativa.3
2 René-Antoine Gauthier, “Introduction”, in Aristotle, L’Ethique à Nicomaque, ed.
René-Antoine Gauthier and Jean-Yves Jolif (Louvain–Paris, 1970) 1: 120–131; id., “Prae-
fatio”, in Aristotle, Ethica nicomachea, ed. René-Antoine Gauthier (Leiden–Brussels,
1972–1974), CCXI–CCXLVII.
3 Aristotle, Ethica nicomachea 6.8 (1141b23–1142a11), trans. Robert Grosseteste (recen-
sio recognita), ed. Gauthier, p. 485; cf. also ibid., p. 261 (recensio pura). For an English
translation see Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. James A.K. Thomson, rev. Hugh
Tredennick, intr. Jonathan Barnes (London, 2004), 154–155: “Political science and pru-
dence are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Prudence con-
cerning the state has two aspects: one, which is controlling and directive, is legislative
science; the other, which deals with particular circumstances, bears the name that prop-
erly belongs to both, that is, political science. This latter is practical and deliberative;
for an enactement is a thing that can be done, and the last step 〈in a deliberative pro-
cess〉. That is why only these persons are said to take part in politics, because they are
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At ﬁrst sight, two main problems are at stake. On the one hand,
Aristotle tries to explain why and in what sense politics and prudence
are from diﬀerent viewpoints the same and not the same; on the other
hand, he discusses the relationship among diﬀerent kinds of prudence.
Grosseteste does not solve the problem by distinguishing between ‘poli-
tics’ as ‘political science’–that is, a set of cognitions regarding a certain
object (in this case, city-state government)–and ‘prudence’ as a virtu-
ous disposition (habitus) of the soul.4 On the contrary, he translates the
Greek as politica and embarks with Aristotle on a sort of classiﬁcation
of politics (and prudence too), which is made more complicated by the
fact that in this classiﬁcation two key terms, prudentia and politica, des-
ignate at the same time, broadly speaking, both a concept and one of
its subordinate meanings. The classiﬁcation is divided into two parts.
In the ﬁrst part, Aristotle focuses his attention on prudence concern-
ing the city, distinguishing between a directive aspect, called legispositiva,
and one dealing with particular matters, called politica, although the
latter term, in ordinary usage, is also common to both aspects. After
an eﬀort to explain a way of speaking that does not include legislators
among politici, Aristotle oﬀers a more detailed classiﬁcation encompass-
ing individual, domestic, and political prudence. Politica is divided in
turn into legislative and political, most probably in the sense already
explained in the ﬁrst classiﬁcation. The latter is said to have a delib-
erative and a judicative part. In this passage, the Aristotelian text con-
tains the ambiguous statement that prudence seems (videtur) to concern
above all (maxime) the individual. It is not absolutely certain whether the
Stagirite is here expressing his own opinion or merely reporting a com-
mon way of thinking and speaking. In the following and concluding
lines, which I have not quoted, Aristotle presents and rejects the opin-
ion that politicians cannot be regarded as prudent because a prudent
man should conﬁne himself to his own interests.5
the only ones that perform actions, like the artisans in 〈industry〉. Prudence is also espe-
cially identiﬁed with that form of it which is concerned with the self and the individual,
and bears the name, prudence, that rightly belongs to all the forms, the others being
called domestic, legislative and political science, and the last-named being devided into
deliberative and juridical science”.
4 As happens in the English translation cited in the previous note. Cf. Aristo-
tle, Nikomachische Ethik, trans. Eugen Rolfes, rev. Günter Bien (Hamburg, 1985), 139,
which translates the concepts with “Staatskunst” and “Klugheit”, respectively; Aristo-
tle, Etica nicomachea, trans. Marcello Zanatta (Milano, 1986), 607, speaks of “politica”
and “saggezza”; likewise Aristotle, Etica nicomachea, trans. Carlo Natali (Bari, 1999), 239.
5 I focussed my attention on this last part in “Individuelle und politische Klugheit
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Conﬂicting interpretations: Eustratius and Albert the Great
It is not surprising that medieval commentators had diﬃculties in inter-
preting these passages, and in particular in understanding what Aristo-
tle meant by claiming that politics and prudence are at the same time
identical and diﬀerent. Henry of Friemar was well aware of the result-
ing disagreement among interpreters. In his commentary he wrote haec
littera a diversis diversimode exponitur6 while John Buridan, some decades
later, echoed this position, stressing that diversimode autem opinantes hanc
auctoritatem diversimode exponunt.7
Medieval commentators on book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics could
often ﬁnd some help in Eustratius’s commentary, which Grosseteste
had translated together with the Aristotelian text;8 but as far as this
passage is concerned, the Greek bishop seems more interested in oﬀer-
ing his own interpretation of the problem than in trying to reconstruct
Aristotle’s thought. His exegesis of the ‘partial’ identity of politics and
prudence rests on the assumption that prudentia concerns ﬁrst and fore-
most the individual. He maintains that they are the same in that both
fulﬁll the task of bene consiliari and optimum homini operabilium coniectari,
while they diﬀer because politics concerns the city (civitas). According
to Eustratius, it is possible to speak of prudentia in a general sense, but
also, more speciﬁcally, of prudentia politica and prudentia moralis: the lat-
ter can be a synonym for prudentia without further qualiﬁcation.9 In the
in den mittelalterlichen Ethikkommentaren (von Albert bis Buridan)”, in Individuum
und Individualität im Mittelalter, ed. Jan A. Aertsen and Andreas Speer (Berlin–New
York, 1996), 464–478; a revised version of this paper in Italian is published on-line
as “Est autem et politica et prudentia, idem quidem habitus: Appunti sul rapporto tra
prudentia e politica in alcuni interpreti medievali del VI libro dell’Etica nicomachea (da
Alberto Magno a Buridano)”, Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics 4 (2002), issue devoted to
Individuo ed universale nelle dottrine morali del medio evo latino, ed. Guido Alliney and Luciano
Cova (http://www.units.it/~etica/2002_2/index.html).
6 Henry of Friemar, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6 q. 14, MS Erlangen, UB 212, f. 153va.
For the transmission of this commentary see Clemens Stroick, Heinrich von Friemar:
Leben, Werke, philosophisch-theologische Stellung in der Scholastik (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1954),
esp. 53–59; Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics, 466–467.
7 John Buridan, [Questiones] super libros Ethicorum 6 q. 14 (Paris, 1513; repr. Frankfurt
am Main, 1968), f. 129va.
8 The most complete information on this collection of commentaries is contained in
Mercken’s introductions to his The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle
in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln († 1253), ed. H. Paul F. Mercken
(Leiden–Louvain, 1973–). Unfortunately, the commentaries on books 5 and 6 are still
unedited. I will use MS Cambridge, Peterhouse 116.
9 Eustratius, In sextum Aristotelis moralium, MS Cambridge, Peterhouse 116, f. 137ra:
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following lines Eustratius explains that the diﬀerence between the two
dispositions reﬂects a diﬀerence between the persons who can possess
them. On the one hand, thanks to prudentia, the citizen (civis) reaches
the good for himself in political life practicing political virtues, either
obeying more prudent people or understanding the reasons for actions
that lead to human perfection. On the other hand, prudentia politica
allows the politicus to deal with other citizens and to take care of the
whole city. Not surprisingly, Eustratius does not conceive of the sphere
of moral prudence as completely separated from political life, but nev-
ertheless understands political prudence as a disposition that not every
citizen possesses. Moral prudence and political prudence should there-
fore be regarded as diﬀerent dispositions, because they have diﬀerent
subiecta.10 These two dispositions can also be distinguished as a common
prudence and a speciﬁc one, although the latter is called prudentia in
ordinary language, and the former, concerning the common good, is
called politica.11 Eustratius conﬁrms this interpretation some lines later,
commenting on the sentence videtur autem et prudencia maxime esse que circa
ipsum et unum et habet ipsa commune nomen prudencia, that he understands
this as an expression of Aristotle’s thought and not as a common opin-
ion he is merely reporting. According to his Greek interpreter, Aristotle
is arguing here in favour of the idea that prudence in its proper sense
concerns the individual and what is useful for him. If anything, what
should be explained is why the Stagirite, while thinking that prudence
is a disposition concerning the individual, insists on calling prudentia also
dispositions concerning politics and the household. Eustratius answers
“Eadem quidem est politica et prudencia secundum quod utreque habent bene consil-
iari et optimum homini operabilium coniectari secundum ratiocinationem. Quia autem
prudencia quidem secundum se ipsam prudentis est et coniectantis sibi ipsi optimum
operabilium, politica autem communiter ciuitati optima coniectatur, propter hoc diﬀer-
unt ad inuicem ratione. Est enim et politica prudencia coniectativa, sed conferencium
ciuitati communiter; non politica autem prudencia, sed moralis, proprie uni optima
coniectat”.
10 Ibid.: “Quare ipsa quidem ciuis prudencia, illa autem politici, quia et ciuis qui-
dem unus eorum qui in ciuitate utilium sibi ipsi coniectatiuus et sibi ipsi soli politicas
uirtutes dirigere curam faciens, uel obediendo prudencioribus uel discendo et rationes
habendo eorum que agit et operatur ducencium ad eam que secundum hominem
perfectionem; politicus autem habens quidem et artem qualiter oportet cum ciuibus
conuersari, curam agens autem et communiter omnis ciuitatis, ut utique in omnibus
qui in ipsa dirigatur melius”.
11 Ibid.: “Diuidens prudentiam in specialem et communem et specialem quidem
nominans communi nomine, politicam autem communem ut communiter de urbani-
tate coniectatiuam…”.
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that such virtuous dispositions concern contingent and useful human
actions, just as prudence does, but diﬀer from prudence because their
subiecta diﬀer according to quantity (a household regards more than one
person, politics even more people). According to this interpretation, it is
possible to speak of a prudentia politica,12 a concept that does not surface
as such in Aristotle’s text.
The great scholar Gauthier considered this interpretation of Aris-
totle’s meaning completely wrong (“un contresens”);13 nevertheless, for
the ﬁrst medieval commentators Eustratius was the most authoritative
hermeneutic tool to which they had access. This does not imply, how-
ever, that they followed him blindly. On the contrary, Albert the Great,
in his ﬁrst commentary on the Ethics, alludes to Eustratius’s interpreta-
tion several times,14 but chooses a diﬀerent one. This is evident already
at the level of literal exegesis: the more concise literal commentary by
Albert ignores Eustratius’s explanation of the ‘partial’ identity between
prudence and refers the reader to his own question devoted to the sub-
ject. More importantly, Albert interprets the phrase videtur autem et pru-
dencia maxime esse que circa ipsum et unum et habet ipsa commune nomen prudencia
as the position of antiqui philosophi that Aristotle discusses but rejects.15
Albert’s disagreement with Eustratius is evident in his questions. The
question beginning Videtur, quod prudentia et politica sint idem habitus con-
cludes that they are the same dispositions, diﬀering only according to
modus or ratio, because, Albert says, prudence belongs to reason in its
directive function, while politics pertains to the level of execution.16 In
the following question he adds that Aristotle’s division of prudence does
not proceed according to species, but according to diﬀerent modes, so
that prudentia as a common concept does not possess a generic unity, but
12 See above, n. 9.
13 See the comments by Gauthier in Aristotle, L’Ethique à Nicomaque, p. 498.
14 See e.g. Albert the Great, Super Ethica 6.11 (549), ed. Wilhelm Kübel, Opera omnia
(Münster, 1951–) 14: 472. On Albert’s ethical thought, see Jörn Müller, Natürliche Moral
und philosophische Ethik bei Albertus Magnus (Münster, 2001) and, among the many and
interesting contributions of this author, the article published in this volume.
15 Ibid., p. 471: “Primo ponit rationem et dicit, quod videtur quibusdam antiquis
philosophis, quod prudentia maxime sit circa unum et proprium bonum…” (the italics in
the edition highlight borrowings from Aristotle’s text).
16 Ibid. (544), p. 467: “Dicendum, quod prudentia et politica sunt idem habitus
secundum subiectum, sed diﬀerunt secundum modum sive secundum rationem, quia
prudentia se magis tenet ex parte rationis dirigentis, quia est cum ratione eligibilium,
sed politica se magis tenet ex parte operis; est enim quidam habitus eligibilium, prout
sunt operabilia”.
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a unity through analogy.17 The consequences of this diﬀerent interpre-
tation of the relation between politics and prudence emerge clearly in
the following question, where Albert discusses the view quod prudentia sit
circa ea que sunt communitatis. In fact, he does not even consider the pos-
sibility that prudentia could concern exclusively, or even primarily, the
individual. Perfect prudence is able to direct actions both on the per-
sonal level and on the level of community. Although aware of the fact
that there exist persons who seem to possess prudence in only one of
these two spheres, the Dominican explains such cases as examples of
merely imperfect prudence.18
The history of the reception of this Aristotelian passage in the Latin
West begins, therefore, with a noticeable disagreement. The Greek
commentator suggests that Aristotle here distinguishes between pru-
dence in its most proper sense, as a virtue concerning the individual,
and politics, as an aspect of prudence taken in a more general sense,
namely the aspect concerned with the good of the community. He also
thinks that this latter aspect is speciﬁc to a particular group of persons
(politicians), while ordinary citizens content themselves with prudentia.
A ‘political prudence’ does exist and belongs especially to the rulers.
In his view, the partial identity between prudence and politics can be
interpreted in a weaker way: that is, prudence in its more general sense
encompasses more aspects, applied to diﬀerent subjects of moral life,
and one of them is politics. In Albert’s view, on the other hand, pru-
dence and politics regard the same wide spectrum of objects, diﬀering
only because the former is more connected to direction and the latter
to execution. Albert refrains from considering individual prudence as
17 Ibid. (545), p. 468: “Dicendum, quod alia est divisio in species et alia in modos;
divisio in species, quando dividitur genus per diversas diﬀerentias speciﬁcas, divisio
autem in modos, quando sunt tantum diversae rationes in participatione unius com-
munis, sicut analogum dividitur. Et talis divisio est hic, quia diversae partes prudentiae,
quas assignat, non sunt diversae species nec diﬀerentes per substantiam habitus, sed per
esse…”.
18 Ibid. (547), pp. 469–470: “Dicendum, quod prudentia, si simpliciter habeatur,
dirigit in propriis et in his quae ad communitatem pertinent, quia non est perfecte
prudens, qui se et alios regere nescit…; sed secundum quid est prudens, qui tantum
scit se habere bene in propriis. Similiter etiam sunt aliqui qui bene se habent in
regimine communitatis, sed in propriis nesciunt seipsos regere, et huius ratio est, vel
quia contemnunt propria vel quia propriorum rationes sunt magis particulares et homo
pluribus periculis subiacet quam civitas, et universale semper facilius est ad sciendum
quam particulare. Tamen inter has duas prudentia principalior est illa quae ordinat
bene in his quae sunt communitatis, quae est circa divinius bonum. Tamen etiam qui
deﬁcit in altero, non attingit optimum, quod est virtutis”.
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prudence in its proper sense and rejects the idea of dividing prudence
in general into species; on the contrary, he supports the idea that pru-
dence simpliciter regards both the aﬀairs of the individual and of the
community. In all likelihood, then, it is not by chance that he does not
employ the expression prudentia politica.
Aquinas’s solution
Eustratius’s interpretation was deemed to have greater success in the
following years, in part because in his later paraphrasis of the Nico-
machean Ethics Albert seems to abandon his own former interpretation,19
but especially because Thomas Aquinas embraces the opinion of the
Greek commentator. In fact, Aquinas’s Sententia libri Ethicorum adopts the
distinction between prudentia and politica put forth by Eustratius: the for-
mer is right reason concerning good and evil actions of the individual,
while the latter regards what Aquinas calls multitudo civilis.20 He speaks
of an identity secundum substantiam and of a diﬀerence secundum rationem,
in terms that seem to echo his teacher Albert, but interprets this dif-
ference as speciﬁc in a technical sense, that is, as a diﬀerentia speciﬁca.21
Consistent with this view, Aquinas regards the sentence videtur autem
et prudentia maxime esse que circa ipsum et unum as expressing Aristotle’s
own position. As a consequence, prudence applied to the individual
retains the common name not only for linguistic reasons (that is, other
19 Albert the Great, Ethica 6.2.24, Opera omnia, ed. Stephanus C.A. Borgnet, 38
vols. (Paris, 1890–1899) 7: 441: “Sunt autem politica et prudentia idem habitus: esse
autem non est idem ipsis. Homo enim homo est et civis; et ideo conferens homini non
perfecte confert nisi perfecte conferat et civi: et ideo habitus qui est de conferentibus
homini, sub se continet habitum qui est de conferentibus civilitati… prudentia maxime
videtur esse circa ea quae sunt homini per se solum existenti conferentia: haec enim
est cui nomen prudentiae maxime deputatur. Aliarum autem prudentiarum quae sunt
circa conferentia homini, non secundum quod est per se solus, sed secundum quod
est domesticus vel civis, alia est denominatio…”. As one can easily see, here Albert
does not attribute this claim to “ancient philosophers”, as he had done in his ﬁrst
commentary.
20 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6.7, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita
(Rome, 1882–) 47: 356: “… politica et prudentia sunt idem habitus secundum sub-
stantiam, quia utraque est recta ratio rerum agibilium circa humana bona vel mala,
sed diﬀerunt secundum rationem; nam prudentia est recta ratio agibilium circa unius
hominis bona vel mala, id est sui ipsius, politica autem circa bona vel mala totius mul-
titudinis civilis”.
21 Ibid., p. 357: “omnia ergo de quibus hic ﬁt mentio in tantum sunt species pruden-
tiae in quantum…”.
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aspects have their own, speciﬁc names, such as yconomia, legispositio, poli-
tica), but also because prudence maxime concerns individual matters.22
This does not imply, however, that Aquinas ignores the principle that
the whole is superior to its parts;23 he acknowledges that political pru-
dence is ‘more principal’ than prudence concerning the individual or
the household and obviously rejects, together with Aristotle, the idea
that people who devote themselves to the common good are not prop-
erly prudent. Nevertheless, he maintains that prudentia in its unqualiﬁed
sense concerns the individual.24 The expression prudentia politica there-
fore ﬁnds its place in his exposition of Aristotle’s text.25 In the Sententia
libri Ethicorum Aquinas also introduces the concept pars that had already
surfaced in Albert’s commentary. This is reminiscent of works written
before the complete translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, which often
listed diﬀerent ‘parts’ of the cardinal virtues.26
The treatment of prudentia in the Summa theologiae exploits in a system-
atic way the concept of parts of the virtue, allowing for potential, inte-
gral, and subjective parts of prudence. Leaving aside potential and inte-
gral parts, which would deserve a separate treatment, it is important to
notice that Aquinas inserts politics among the subjective parts, explain-
ing that prudence, taken in a general sense, has several species.27 Their
classiﬁcation follows a principle of binary division: the two main species
22 Ibid.: “Dicit ergo primo quod, quamvis politica, tam legispositiva quam executiva,
sit prudentia, tamen maxime videtur esse prudentia quae est circa unum tantum,
scilicet circa se ipsum”.
23 Important studies of the problematic relationship between the individual good
and the common good in late medieval political thought are Matthew S. Kempshall,
“The Individual Good in Late Medieval Scholastic Political Thought—Nicomachean
Ethics I.2 and IX.8”, in Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter, 493–510; id., The
Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford, 1999).
24 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6.7, p. 357: “Est etiam considerandum
quod, quia totum principalius est parte et per consequens civitas quam domus et domus
quam unus homo, oportet quod prudentia politica sit principalior quam yconomica et
haec quam illa quae est sui ipsius directiva”.
25 Ibid.: “… quaedam vero est politica, id est prudentia exsequendi leges”.
26 Ibid.: “aliae partes prudentiae”. Cf. Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et
XIIIe siècles (Louvain–Gembloux, 1942–1960) 3: 255–278. I focussed my attention on
such issues from the point of view of the sources of De regimine principum in my “Tra etica
e politica: La prudentia del principe nel De regimine di Egidio Romano”, Documenti e studi
sulla tradizione ﬁlosoﬁca medievale 3 (1992), esp. 109–126.
27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae II.II.47.11, Opera omnia 8: 359: “Unde necesse
est quod et prudentiae diﬀerant specie secundum diﬀerentiam horum ﬁnium: ut scilicet
una sit prudentia simpliciter dicta, quae ordinatur ad bonum proprium; alia autem
oeconomica, quae ordinatur ad bonum commune domus vel familiae; et tertia politica,
quae ordinatur ad bonum commune civitatis vel regni”.
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diﬀer because one concerns the individual, while the other regards a
multitude; such a multitude can be gathered for a purpose limited in
time, such as an army, or for a purpose that extends to a lifetime. If
the second possibility is the case, then one can distinguish between the
domestic and the political community. When applied to these diﬀer-
ent communities, prudence becomes in the ﬁrst case prudentia oeconomica,
in the second prudentia politica. The latter, in turn, can be regnativa, i.e.,
directive and peculiar to the ruler, or politica simpliciter, the kind of polit-
ical prudence which is peculiar to subjects.28
One can easily see that Aquinas follows Eustratius in explaining the
main diﬀerence between prudence and politics, although he applies the
distinction between the virtue of the citizen and the virtue of the politi-
cian to a sub-species of prudentia politica. In his view, prudence concern-
ing the individual does not denote a virtue belonging to the individual
qua citizen, as Eustratius seemed to suggest, but rather a virtue of the
individual qua individual. Thus it not surprising that Aquinas feels the
need to discuss whether prudence concerning the individual’s good and
prudence concerning the common good are the same in species (Utrum
prudentia quae est respectu boni proprii sit eadem specie cum ea quae se extendit ad
bonum commune).29 His answer—that prudence in its most general sense,
but not in its speciﬁc sense, is identical with politics30—seems to sug-
gest that the connection between these two dispositions of the soul is a
loose one. If one also considers the fact that according to Aquinas, the
virtue of the ‘citizen’ is part of prudentia politica, then his position seems
to come closer to the claim that the virtue of the good man and of
the good citizen do not coincide. Aristotle himself in the Politics restricts
28 Ibid. II.II.48.1, pp. 365–366: “Partes autem subiectivae virtutis dicuntur species
eius diversae. Et hoc modo partes prudentiae, secundum quod proprie sumuntur, sunt
prudentia per quam aliquis regit seipsum, et prudentia per quam aliquis regit multi-
tudinem, quae diﬀerunt specie, ut dictum est, et iterum prudentia quae est multitudinis
regitiva dividitur in diversas species secundum diversas species multitudinis. Est autem
quaedam multitudo adunata ad aliquod speciale negotium, sicut exercitus congregatur
ad pugnandum: cuius regitiva est prudentia militaris. Quaedam vero multitudo est
adunata ad totam vitam: sicut multitudo unius domus vel familiae, cuius regitiva est
prudentia oeconomica; et multitudo unius civitatis vel regni, cuius quidem directiva est
in principe regnativa, in subditis autem politica simpliciter dicta”.
29 Ibid. II.II.47.11, pp. 359–360.
30 Ibid., p. 359: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus non intendit dicere
quod politica sit idem secundum substantiam habitus cuilibet prudentiae: sed pruden-
tiae quae ordinatur ad bonum commune. Quae quidem prudentia dicitur secundum
communem rationem prudentiae, prout scilicet est quaedam recta ratio agibilium: dici-
tur autem politica secundum ordinem ad bonum commune”.
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the validity of this claim to perverse forms of constitution.31 Moreover,
Aquinas seems to draw a distinction in species between the prudence of
the ruler and that of the ruled (although both are sub-species of pruden-
tia politica, which is in itself a species of the genus prudentia).
As mentioned before, Aquinas’s interpretation prevailed. It was
adopted with some minor modiﬁcations by Giles of Rome in his De
regimine principum, a book that not only claimed to provide princes with
a ‘mirror’ updated to reﬂect the medieval reception of Aristotle’s prac-
tical philosophy,32 but which also served as easier access to the Nico-
machean Ethics for learned people.33 In the relevant passages Giles draws
inspiration not from the binary division of q. 48, but directly from q. 50
of the Secunda secundae,34 stating plainly that prudentia can be divided into
ﬁve parts: particularis (concerning the individual), oeconomica (concerning
the government of one’s family), regnativa et legum positiva (concerning
the city or the kingdom and necessary in the ruler), politica sive civilis
(concerning obedience to the laws and to the orders of the ruler), mili-
taris (concerning obstacles—such as enemies—that must be removed).35
As often happens when a doctrine is transmitted to a wider audience,
the simpliﬁcation pushes the doctrine itself to its limits. In the De regimine
principum, prudence possesses many species that Giles puts on the same
level, and regnativa diﬀers from politica as oeconomica does from militaris.
This implies that there is a species of prudence speciﬁcally diﬀerent
from prudence concerning the individual and from the prudence which
31 This issue was usually discussed in commentaries on Aristotle; see Christoph
Flüeler, Rezeption und Interpretation der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter (Amster-
dam–Philadelphia, 1992), esp. 107, 116, 143, 144, 147, 150, 161. For a recent and inter-
esting discussion of this issue see also Marco Toste, “Virtue and the City: The Virtues
of the Ruler and the Citizen in the Medieval Reception of Aristotle’s Politics”, in Princely
Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200–1500, ed. István P. Bejczy and Cary J. Nederman (Turn-
hout, forthcoming). I wish to thank the author who allowed me to read the text before
publication.
32 Roberto Lambertini, “Il ﬁlosofo, il principe e la virtù: Note sulla ricezione e l’uso
dell’Etica Nicomachea nel De regimine principum di Egidio Romano”, in Documenti e studi
sulla tradizione ﬁlosoﬁca medievale 2 (1991), 239–279; id., “The Prince in the Mirror of
Philosophy: About the Use of Aristotle in Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum”, in
Les philosophies morales et politiques au moyen âge/Moral and Political Philosophies in the Middle
Ages, ed. B. Carlos Bazán, Eduardo Andújar, and Léonard G. Sbrocchi (New York etc.,
1995), 1522–1534.
33 See e.g. Charles F. Briggs, Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum: Reading and Writing
Politics at Court and University, c. 1275 – c. 1525 (Cambridge, 1999).
34 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae II.II.50, pp. 374–377.
35 Giles of Rome, De regimine principum 3.3.1 (Rome, 1607; repr. Aalen, 1967), 556–558.
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regulates the actions of the ruler, namely ‘political prudence’: a con-
sequence that ﬁts perfectly into the absolutistic tendency of the whole
work.36
Thanks to Giles’s mediating role, Aquinas’s interpretation not only
reached a wider public, it also inﬂuenced deeply the discussion at
the Arts Faculty in Paris in the last decades of the thirteenth cen-
tury. Question commentaries of the period have been the object of
intense study since Grabmann’s times because of their purported ‘Aver-
roism’. Their investigation contributed a lot to our reconstruction of
an ethics of the Parisian Arts Masters.37 Setting aside questions about
the broader inﬂuence of Aquinas on the Arts masters, we can observe
that their approach to problems concerning the relationship between
politics and prudence, if not always their solutions, is much indebted
to Aquinas’s last works. The question at stake is whether the diﬀerent
species of prudentia constitute a unity or not, and the title of the ques-
tion sometimes even reproduces the wording in the Summa theologiae.
This is the case, e. g., for the commentary transmitted by MS Erlan-
gen, Universitätsbibliothek 213, containing the question utrum eadem sit
prudentia que est respectu boni proprii et que respectu boni alieni sive communis
boni, which solves the problem by adopting Aquinas’s solution.38 The
36 Ibid., p. 557: “Quarta species prudentiae dicitur esse politica siue ciuilis. Nam
sicut in principiante requiritur excellens prudentia qua sciat alios regere, sic in quolibet
ciue requiritur prudentia aliqualis qua noscat adimplere leges et mandata principantis
… Diﬀert autem haec prudentia a prudentia particulari, quam collocauimus in prima
specie. Nam aliud est quod sciat se regere ut est aliquid in se, et aliud ut est subiectus
principis”.
37 To mention only some recent contributions: Georg Wieland, “The Perfection of
Man: On the Cause, Mutability, and Permanence of Human Happiness in 13th Cen-
tury Commentaries on the Ethica nicomachea (EN)”, in Il commento ﬁlosoﬁco nell’Occidente
latino (secoli XIII–XV), ed. Gianfranco Fioravanti, Claudio Leonardi, and Stefano Per-
fetti (Turnhout, 2002), 359–377; Luca Bianchi, “Felicità intellettuale, ascetismo e ara-
bismo: Nota sul De summo bono di Boezio di Dacia”, in Le felicità nel medioevo, ed.
Maria Bettetini and Francesco D. Paparella (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2005), 13–34; Iacopo
Costa, “La dottrina della felicità nel ‘Commento del Vaticano’ all’Etica nicomachea”,
ibid. 325–353; id., “Il commento all’Etica nicomachea di Radulfo Brito: Edizione critica
del testo con uno studio critico, storico e dottrinale” (Ph.D. diss. Università degli Studi
di Salerno/Université de Paris IV-Sorbonne, 2007). See also Costa’s contribution to this
volume.
38 Questiones in Ethicam, MS Erlangen, UB 213, f. 70rb: “Dicendum quod prudentie
communiter accepte diuerse sunt species quarum una dicitur appropriato nomine pru-
dentia, alia yconomica et 〈alia〉 politica et illius politice alia est regnatiua siue legisposi-
tiua et alia appropriato nomine dicitur politica. Diuersitas autem istorum habituum
sic patet, quia diuersitas habituum accipitur a diuersitate actuum seu obiectorum,
non secundum quamcumque diuersiﬁcationem obiectorum, sed secundum formalem,
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commentary attributed to Radulphus Brito raises the question Utrum
prudentia et politica sint idem and answers that this virtue in its general
sense is divided into diﬀerent species.39 Only Giles of Orléans prefers a
solution closer to Albert’s, stating that the unity of prudence should be
explained in terms of analogy, not in terms of genus.40
Henry of Friemar and the critical reaction to Aquinas’s solution
As I have shown elsewhere,41 disputed and quodlibetal questions from
the end of the thirteenth century and the ﬁrst decades of fourteenth
bear witness to a certain unease towards the solution championed by
Aquinas. While most authors adopt the idea of a distinction between
diﬀerent prudences, and coherently make use of the concept of prudentia
politica, they have trouble accepting that such ‘sub-prudences’ should be
distinguished as ‘species’, in part because this seems to imply that one
of such species can exist without another. Among the critical reactions,
inquantum sunt obiecta, ut dicitur secundo De anima. Modo obiecta istorum habituum
specie distinguuntur, ergo et ipsi habitus quia obiectum istorum habituum… est bonum
humanum; modo aliud est bonum unius hominis et aliud familie et aliud ciuitatis; in
diuersis enim ista bona consistunt et ideo obiecta istorum specie diﬀerunt formaliter,
ideo et habitus. Unde prudentia est habitus uel recta ratio quo quis bene consiliatur de
bonis suis(?)…”.
39 Radulphus Brito, Questiones in Ethicam, MS Vatican City, BAV Vat. lat. 832, f. 36ra:
“Dico ad questionem quod prudentia accipitur in communi uel proprie et stricte;
si accipiatur in communi sic sunt eius tres partes, scilicet monostica, yconomica et
politica. Si accipiatur proprie et stricte sic distincta est a politica et yconomica, cuius
ratio est quod illi habitus sunt distincti quorum sunt distincta obiecta. Sed monostice,
cui appropriatur nomen prudencie, et yconomice et politice sunt diuersa obiecta, quia
obiectum monostice est bonum unius secundum se et prudentia monostica est recta
ratio in operationibus unius hominis…”; for the attribution to Radulphus, see now
Iacopo Costa, “Il commento all’Etica nicomachea di Radulfo Brito”. For similar texts
in related commentaries see René-Antoine Gauthier, “Trois commentaires ‘averroïstes’
sur l’Éthique à Nicomaque”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 16 (1947–
1948), 189–213.
40 Giles of Orléans, Questiones in Ethicam, MS Paris, BnF lat. 16089, f. 221rb: “Unde
notandum quod prudentia non est una secundum speciem et formam sed secundum
analogiam et proportionem; est enim una sicut scientia; dicitur autem una scientia
non quia sit unius obiecti secundum speciem et formam, sed quia est unius obiecti
secundum attributionem sicut patet de prima philosophia que considerat ens secundum
quod ens quod non est unum nisi secundum analogiam et sicut dicitur scientia una
ita et prudentia dicitur una; bonum autem hominis scilicet secundum quod est pars
ciuitatis ordinatur ad unum sicut ad ultimam hominis felicitatem”.
41 Roberto Lambertini, “Political Quodlibeta”, in Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle
Ages: The Thirteenth Century, ed. Christopher Schabel (Leiden, 2006), 441–444.
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Godfrey of Fontaines’s disputed question, Utrum prudentia sit una, was
especially inﬂuential.42
Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics are also involved in this
development. Henry of Friemar’s work, which includes both literal
commentary and questions, is a telling example. The Augustinian friar
seems so eager to address the problem that he even anticipates the
discussion with respect to Albert or Aquinas. As already indicated,
the issue was clearly related to the text contained in chapter 6.6 of
the Ethics (according to the division of the revised version of the Liber
Ethicorum). In the preceding chapter, however, claiming that the virtue
of sapientia occupies the highest position among the intellectual virtues,
Aristotle had rejected its identiﬁcation with prudence and with politics,
claiming that in this case there would be more than one sapientia.43 For
a master aware of debates about the unity of prudence, this passage
(which seems to imply that there are many ‘prudences’) provides a
good opportunity to raise the issue and discuss it; so Henry inserts here
a long and detailed quaestio bearing the title utrum prudentia que dirigit
bonum unius sit eadem specie cum ea que dirigit bonum yconomicum uel civile. He
feels it necessary to prove at the outset that prudentia concerning the
individual good, called here prudentia monastica, is in itself one. The need
to restate the unity of the prudence with respect to the various aspects
of individual moral life could also be related to the tendency, discussed
and rejected in authors such as Godfrey of Fontaines, to think that
each moral virtue can possess its own prudence.44 After dismissing the
idea that there can exist a speciﬁc prudence for each virtue, Henry is
42 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quaestiones ordinariae 3, in Le quodlibet XV et trois questions ordi-
naires de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. Odon Lottin (Louvain, 1937), 119–138. On Godfrey’s
political thought see Kempshall, The Common Good, 204–263; on prudence in particular:
ibid., 234, 257.
43 Aristotle, Ethica nicomachea 6.6 (1141a25–31), trans. Robert Grosseteste (recensio recog-
nita), p. 484: “Circa se ipsum enim singula quidem bene speculans diceretur utique esse
prudens et huic concederent ipsa. Propter quod et bestiarum quasdam prudentes aiunt
esse quecumque circa ipsarum vitam videntur potenciam habere provisivam. Manifes-
tum autem utique erit quoniam non utique erit sapiencia et politica eadem. Si enim
eam que circa utilia ipsis dicunt sapienciam, multe erunt sapiencie”.
44 See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quaestiones ordinariae 3, pp. 129–132 (suggesting that in a
certain sense each moral virtue can have its own prudence but arguing that all these
diﬀerent prudences are uniﬁed); for the context see Odon Lottin, Psychologie et morale 4:
548–663; for Scotus’s position see Stephen D. Dumont, “The Necessary Connection
of Moral Virtue to Prudence According to John Duns Scotus—Revisited”, Recherches
de théologie ancienne et médiévale 50 (1988), 184–206; Bonnie Kent, Virtues of the Will: The
Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, 1995), esp. 193–195.
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confronted with the problem of the identity of monastica, yconomica, and
civilis. It is not surprising that he presents contrarie opiniones on this issue.45
The ﬁrst asserts that the aforementioned virtues diﬀer by species, while
the second claims exactly the opposite, that is, that they are speciﬁcally
identical. Both opinions, according to Henry, allow for doubts. For
example, a distinction by species seem to imply that the related moral
virtues also diﬀer, so that the temperance exercised by a man who
runs the political community would be diﬀerent from the temperance
that regulates the actions of the head of a household. Henry ﬁnds this
consequence contrary to experience.46 Moreover, recalling an argument
put forward by Godfrey of Fontaines,47 Henry remarks that such a
distinction between ‘prudences’ diﬀerent by species implies that the
new leader of a political community cannot have the prudence that
a leader should, because virtue is acquired through experience, and
nobody can have experience in ruling others before being in charge.48
45 Henry of Friemar, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6 q. 14, f. 151rb: “Secundo restat inquiren-
dum utrum ista prudentia sit eadem specie cum prudentia yconomica uel etiam ciuili,
circa quod sunt contrarie opiniones. Quidam enim dicunt quod iste prudentie diﬀer-
unt specie… Alii autem econtrario dicunt quod prudentia in hiis tribus est eiusdem
speciei”.
46 Ibid., f. 151va: “Utraque autem istarum opinionum uidetur dubitabilis. Si enim
dicatur secundum primam opinionem quod iste prudentie diﬀerant specie, cum que-
libet virtus formam et rationem virtutis habeat a prudentia, oportet necessario quod
virtutes morales secundum diuersitatem istarum specie diﬀerrent. Et ulterius cum que-
libet virtus moralis connectatur prudentie ut infra declarabitur, oporteret secundo
iuxta diuersitatem prudentiarum 〈con〉nectentium dare tres species virtutum moral-
ium. Quod etiam rationi et experientie contradicit. Experitur enim quilibet in se ipso
quod si 〈de〉 vita monostica transferatur ad communitatem domesticam uel ciuilem,
uel etiam de statu subiectionis ad statum presidentie et gubernacionis, quod easdem
virtutes exercet quas et prius”.
47 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quaestiones ordinariae 3, p. 136: “Si autem loquamur de sub-
dito qui non est subditus sic propter suam indigentiam, sed propter convenientem
ordinem reipublicae quod unus principaliter multis principetur, propter quod contin-
git quod subditus potest esse aequalis in prudentia et virtute cum principe, et talis
secundum veritatem non est subditus, sed secundum legem, sed debet dici bonus vir,
sic est dicendum quod non diﬀerunt realiter sive secundum magis et minus, sed solum
ratione sive ex habitudine et ordine ad aliud… Constat enim quod, cum aliquis bonus
vir princeps ﬁt, nulla ﬁt mutatio realis circa eius prudentiam vel virtutem sed in quan-
tum ex electione vel institutione principis consequitur auctoritatem et potestatem super
alios, potest uti sua prudentia et virtute aliter quam bonus vir, sicut patet in habente
scientiam perfecte absque auctoritate docendi et in habente cum scientia huiusmodi
auctoritatem”.
48 Henry of Friemar, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6 q. 14, f. 151va: “Preterea, si status
presidentie requireret virtutes morales speciei diﬀerentes ab habitus in statu subiec-
tionis, tunc cum aliquis statum regiminis assumeret aut virtutes illi statui debitas non
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Although persuaded that the second opinion is ‘more probable’,
Henry admits that there are strong arguments in favour of the oppos-
ing view. In particular, he is well aware of the fact that Eustratius
seems to have shared it.49 Therefore, in order to avoid contradicting
such an authority, Henry embarks on an interpretation of Eustratius
according to which the ends pursued by the individual, by the head of
the household, and by the politician are coordinated and not diﬀerent
enough to justify, properly speaking, a diﬀerence in species. According
to the Augustinian master, Eustratius must therefore have used the term
‘species’ in a general, not a technical sense.50 Among ‘prudences’, diﬀer-
ences undoubtedly exist, but they concern secondary and instrumental
aspects of the exercise of such a virtue.51 Moreover, Henry is ready to
concede that political prudence requires a higher degree of virtue than
individual prudence; this amounts to saying, however, that one should
at most admit a diﬀerence according to perfection, not according to
substance. Political, domestic, and individual prudence should therefore
be regarded as potential, not subjective parts of prudence taken in its
general sense.52 Concluding his treatment of the issue, Henry is ready to
formulate some arguments in favour of the opinion he does not share,
haberet, eo quod per exercicium nullas virtutes acquirere potuit, aut si detur quod
habeat virtutes prius acquisitas, tunc virtutes in statu presidentie et subiectionis secun-
dum speciem diﬀerre non possunt”.
49 Ibid.: “… et secundum hoc opinio secunda probabilior uidetur, licet et ipsa
dubitabilis sit maxime propter Eustratium qui uidetur sentire quod iste prudentie
diﬀerant specie”.
50 Ibid., f. 151vb: “Et ideo ad sustinendum tam Eustratium quam etiam opinionem
secundam que sine preiudicio mihi uidetur probabilior prima uidetur rationabiliter
posse dici quod si considerentur iste prudentie quantum ad eorum formale obiectum
et quantum ad ﬁnem principaliter intentum a quibus principaliter speciﬁcatur iste
habitus sic re vera prudentia… est unius speciei… Si uero considerentur quantum
ad aliqua obiecta et quantum ad ﬁnes non principaliter intentos, sic, cum circa talia
obiecta et in ordine ad tales ﬁnes iste prudentie secundum diuersas rationes dirigant
et precipiant, potest dici quod diﬀerant quantum ad diversam rationem dirigendi
et precipiendi, et istam diﬀerentiam large et improprie loquens Eustratius appellat
diﬀerentiam speciﬁcam”.
51 Ibid.: “ista sunt quedam extrinseca et secundaria obiecta adminiculantia”. This is
most probably an echo of the solution of Godfrey of Fontaines, Quaestiones ordinariae 3,
p. 134: “… multis indigent adminiculis instrumentis quae non requiruntur ad hoc quod
homo se ipsum et in se et in ordine ad alios convenienter dirigat… ideo si prudentia ad
illa comparetur, in ipsa diversitas secundum hoc invenitur”.
52 Henry of Friemar, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6 q. 14, f. 152ra: “Et similiter cum Philoso-
phus inferius distinguat diuersas partes uel species prudentie, non intendit loqui de dif-
ferentia speciﬁca secundum substantiam et speciem habitus, sed solum de diuersitate
partium potentialium…”.
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although he is not persuaded by them. He does this out of respect for
the maiores who upheld that opinion and for those who want to follow
them.53 This seems to me an allusion to Aquinas and his followers.
The problem of the unity of prudence surfaces again when Henry
comments on the Aristotelian passage on which centers the whole dis-
cussion analyzed in this article. As we know, he informs the reader that
there are diverging interpretations of the text. In the ﬁrst place, he
describes one possibility, according to which the identity between pru-
dentia and politica means that politics is identical in substance with the
kind of prudence that leads to common good, and diﬀers only ratione.
The words used to describe this opinion are strongly reminiscent of
Aquinas in the Summa theologiae, although Henry’s rendering does not
take in account all aspects of Aquinas’s position.54 Henry judges such
a reading of Aristotle untenable because he thinks that it is not true
in itself and does not correspond to Aristotle’s intention. First, such an
interpretation fails to account for the diﬀerence between politica under-
stood as a science and prudentia, which is a virtue. Henry argues in fact
that politica as a science, such as monastica—as he calls it—consists of
scientiﬁc dispositions (habitus) of the soul regarding universal principles,
while prudentia politica is more concerned with particulars and experi-
ence.55 Second, it is not faithful to Aristotle’s intention as it emerges
from the context, which is to distinguish between a prudence concerned
with the good of the individual, and another one, called politica,56 that
53 Ibid.: “Rationes prime opinionis solute sunt per iam dicta. Et quia prima opinio
magnorum est, ideo, ne precludatur via ipsam sustinere volentibus, respondendum est
ad rationes utriusque partis”.
54 Ibid., f. 153va: “Quidam dicunt quod non intendit Philosophus quod politica sit
idem habitus secundum substantiam cum qualibet prudentia, sed solum cum prudentia
que dirigit bonum comune politicum; hec enim prudentia—ut dicunt—est idem habi-
tus substantialiter cum politica, sed diﬀert solum secundum esse et secundum rationem,
quia ille habitus dicitur prudentia ut est recta ratio agibilium, sed dicitur politica
inquantum ratiocinatur ad bonum commune”. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae
II.II.47.11, p. 359: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus non intendit dicere
quod politica sit idem secundum substantiam habitus cuilibet prudentiae: sed pruden-
tiae quae ordinatur ad bonum commune. Quae quidem prudentia dicitur secundum
communem rationem prudentiae, prout scilicet est quaedam recta ratio agibilium: dici-
tur autem politica secundum ordinem ad bonum commune”.
55 As a matter of fact, this ﬁrst objection of Henry’s seems to be connected to a
particular meaning of prudentia politica, inspired by the deﬁnition of politica that Aristotle
gives to distinguish it from legispositiva. However, he often uses prudentia politica in a
diﬀerent, broader meaning.
56 Henry of Friemar, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6 q. 14, f. 153va: “Sed ista expositio
dupliciter uidetur deﬁcere. Primo non uidetur vera in se: politica enim sicut et monas-
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leads to the common good. According to Henry’s reconstruction, such
diﬃculties gave rise to a diﬀerent opinion, namely that prudence pos-
sesses a generic unity, as Eustratius suggests;57 but Henry does not share
this opinion, either. He thinks that a distinction in diﬀerent species
applies not to virtues proper but only to the habitus scientiﬁci regarding a
theoretical knowledge concerning good and evil actions. As habitus scien-
tiﬁci, politica and yconomica do diﬀer according to species. Diﬀerent kinds
of prudence diﬀer, on the contrary, only as they pertain to a greater or
smaller number of persons.58 Henry’s next question–utrum legis positiua
que in tertio politice dicitur regnatiua, politica et yconomica sint partes prudentie59–
oﬀers him the opportunity to emphasize the solution already put for-
ward in the preceding discussion: such dispositions of the soul, which
are subordinated to prudence, should be considered as potential parts
of prudence. This does not exclude the view that politics occupies a
higher position on the scale of perfection, because it concerns the com-
mon good and—in its legislative aspect—plays the leading role usually
proper to the ruler. In this sense, prudentia politica is the most perfect
potential part of prudence.60
tica importat quendam habitum scientiﬁcum quo uniuersales raciones agibilium scien-
tiﬁce speculamur. Constat autem quod talis habitus non possit esse idem substantialiter
et realiter cum prudencia politica, tum quia ista est consideratiua agibilium magis prin-
cipaliter et in particulari et per uiam experimenti, illa uero solum uniuersaliter et scien-
tiﬁce, tum etiam quia multi per doctrinam experimentalem habent prudentiam politi-
cam qui tamen nihil de rationibus agibilium scientiﬁce cognoscunt. Secundo quia non
est secundum mentem Philosophi, quia Philosophus hic intendit distinguere notitiam
agibilium in prudentiam simpliciter, que tantum dirigit bonum unius, et in politicam
que considerat bonum multitudinis”.
57 Ibid.: “Et ideo dicunt alii quod prudentia et politica est idem habitus in genere
quia conueniunt in aliqua apparentia quo (sic pro a quibus) accipitur communitas
generis. Nam secundum Eustratium conueniunt in hoc quod est bene consiliari circa
humana bona vel mala sed diﬀerunt secundum esse, id est secundum rationem for-
malem et speculatiuam quia prudentia est bene consiliatiua circa bona conferentia uni
tantum, politica autem circa bona conferentia ciuitati et regno et quia hec bona secun-
dum eos diﬀerunt secundum rationes eorum formales et speciﬁcas, ideo prudencia et
politica important habitus substantialiter et speciﬁce diﬀerentes”. Strangely enough,
Henry does not indicate that this position could also be traced back to Aquinas; the
problem would deserve further investigation.
58 Ibid., f. 153vb: “Et ideo uidetur dicendum consequenter ex dictis quod prudentia
et politica sunt quidem idem habitus in genere ut dictum est, sed esse non est idem
quia bonum humanum quod in ipsis intenditur multitudine diﬀert et paucitate ut patet
ex dictis”.
59 Ibid., f. 154ra: “Sed hic forte dubitaret aliquis utrum legispositiva que in tertio
politice dicitur regnativa et politica et yconomica sint partes prudentiae in communi”.
60 Ibid., f. 154rb: “Sed quia prudentia monastica, yconomica et politica proprie
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The lengthy and somewhat repetitive treatment in Henry’s com-
mentary bears witness to a twofold development. By the beginning
of the fourteenth century an interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics
prevailed that cannot conceive of prudence in its proper sense as a
virtue concerned with the political community, as Aristotle probably
intended. Properly speaking, prudence directs the actions of the individ-
ual towards his end. Thus it becomes customary to speak of a special
kind of prudence, called prudentia politica, that is perceived as diﬀerent
from prudence in itself. The discussion concerns how to undertand this
diﬀerence. Many thinkers are unsatisﬁed with an interpretation that
would separate the aspects of prudence from one another, as if they
would be in reality diﬀerent things. They seem to think that in this way
one could jeopardize the unity of moral life. The attempt to avoid such
a danger is particularly clear in Henry of Friemar, who uses the concept
of ‘potential part’ in order to stress the tight connection among diﬀer-
ent degrees of prudence. The key role attributed to prudence as an
individual virtue is somewhat counterbalanced by emphasizing the pre-
eminence of the part of prudence concerned with the common good.
John Buridan
Against this background, many aspects of John Buridan’s commentary
become more comprehensible. In q. 13 of book 6, utrum prudentia sit
una tantum circa obiecta omnium virtutum moralium, he takes a stand against
the growing tendency to dissolve the unity of prudence.61 This is even
loquendo non diﬀerunt formaliter et speciﬁce quantum ad formam et speciem habitus
qui sumitur ex obiecto formali et primario, sed solum diﬀerunt quantum ad modum
dirigendi circa quedam secundaria obiecta que proprie diuersitatem speciﬁcam indu-
cere non possunt ut patet ex dictis, ideo melius uidetur consequenter dictis tenendum
quod isti habitus inquantum inportant habitum prudentie sic diuersimode denomina-
tum et ad diuersos gradus perfectionis contractum sint partes potentiales ipsius pruden-
tie in communi secundum quas quidem partes diuersus modus directionis in pruden-
tia attenditur et etiam diuersus gradus perfectionis in ipsa acquiritur, secundum quod
dirigit uel ad bonum humanum principaliter intentum in monastica yconomica et poli-
tica uel etiam prout dirigit ad quedam bona secundaria ordinata ad bona principaliter
intenta. Utroque enim modo constat quod perfectior directio prudentie requiritur in
politico quam in yconomico et in illo adhuc perfectior quam in monastico, quia bonum
quanto communius tanto diﬃcilius dirigitur, eo quod ad eius directionem plura con-
sideranda concurrunt”.
61 For discussion of this issue see James J. Walsh, “Buridan on the Connection of the
Virtues”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (1986), 453–482.
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more interesting if one takes into account that Gerald of Odo, whose
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics Buridan knew well and used
extensively,62 supported a somewhat diﬀerent position.63 It is remarkable
that Buridan, as Henry of Friemar before him, defends the unity of
prudence against an argument which had been used also to argue in
favour of a speciﬁc diﬀerence between prudentia monastica and prudentia
politica: the diﬀerence among their respective objects. Buridan claims
that diﬀerent kinds of actions are all objects of prudence according to
one formal ratio, which gives them a sort of unity.64
Question 14 tackles directly the issue at stake, asking Utrum prudentia
monastica et prudentia ciuilis et prudentia oeconomica sint idem habitus uel diversi.
After remarking that Aristotle conﬁnes himself to a puzzling statement
(quoted at the beginning of this essay), and noting that the relevant
passage is interpreted in diﬀerent ways, Buridan introduces three opin-
ions, which we have already considered, at least in part. The supporters
of the ﬁrst think that the identity of individual and political prudence
(here called prudentia civilis) should be explained by the fact that both
inhere in the same subject, that is, the practical intellect. Their diﬀer-
ence is a speciﬁc one, so that diﬀerent ‘prudences’ can be compared to
sweetness and whiteness in milk. Other maintain the opposite, namely
that prudence possesses a speciﬁc identity. When it comes to explaining
why prudence and politics diﬀer, although they are the same disposi-
tion of the soul, the supporters of this opinion divide into two groups.
They all agree that ‘prudences’ are not ‘diﬀerent things’; some, how-
ever, maintain that they nevertheless diﬀer according to species because
they possess diﬀerent rationes quidditativae; others think rather that the
diﬀerence is only accidental. Trying to explain this second position,
Buridan says that the very same habitus, or even the very same actus, can
be regarded by extrinsic denomination as belonging to one prudence
or to another.65 Here the modern reader recognizes the inﬂuence of the
62 Id., “Some Relationships between Gerald Odo’s and John Buridan’s Commen-
taries on Aristotle’s Ethics”, Franciscan Studies 35 (1975), 237–275.
63 On Gerald’s ethics, see Bonnie Kent, “Aristotle and the Franciscans: Gerald
Odonis’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics” (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University,
New York, 1984).
64 John Buridan, Super libros Ethicorum 6 q. 13, f. 129ra–rb: “Ad primam dicendum
est quod omnia operabilia humana sunt obiecta prudentie secundum unam rationem
formalem”.
65 Ibid. 6 q. 14, f. 129va–vb. Among many studies devoted to this work, see Gerhard
Krieger, Der Begriﬀ der praktischen Vernunft nach Johannes Buridanus (Münster, 1986); biblio-
graphical references in Lines, Aristotle’s Ethics, 470–471.
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great ontological debates of the ﬁrst half of the fourteenth century, even
if it is not easy to identify with precision the supporters of the diﬀerent
positions. For example, the ratio quidditativa is strongly reminiscent of the
Scotist tradition and, as a matter of fact, this term was used in a parallel
passage by Gerald of Odo.66
Buridan is well aware that ontological discussions have heavily inﬂu-
enced this conﬂicting interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of prudence,
but he is also very critical in this respect, because he ﬁnds that such
metaphysical subtleties are inappropriate in ethics.67 He thinks it suﬃ-
cient to establish that prudentia monastica, oeconomica, and politica are one
and the same disposition of the soul, because the common and individ-
ual goods coincide. The distinction is possible only secundum rationem.68
If we keep in mind the foregoing discussion, Buridan’s solution is
not very original: identity in esse and distinction ratione is a position that
Henry of Friemar already considered and rejected. Much more original
is the fact that Buridan inserts his solution into a long discussion claim-
ing that this identity holds only for persons who understand the pre-
eminence of spiritual goods in comparison to material goods. Members
of the lower class (vulgus), says Buridan, are interested only in material
goods. For such people, then, individual prudence and prudence direct-
ing one towards the common good cannot be identical. On the level
of the bona corporis and of the bona exteriora, individual prudence and
political prudence do not necessarily coincide; maybe they necessarily
conﬂict. Concluding this excursus Buridan remarks that the mistake of
such a position does not consist in conceiving of prudence as essentially
66 Gerald of Odo, Sententia et expositio cum questionibus… super libros Ethicorum 6 lectio
9 (Venice, 1500), f. 130va–vb: “Et iste tres species sunt idem habitus secundum rem, esse
tamen formale earum seu ratio formalis et quidditatiua earum non est eadem. Quod
patet quia actus earum formales perﬁciunt distincta formaliter, homo enim et ciuis
subditus et princeps et iconomus sunt distincta formaliter secundum rationes suas, ratio
enim hominis est absoluta, alie vero sunt relatiue que nihilominus distinguuntur quia
sunt ad diuersos terminos”.
67 John Buridan, Super libros Ethicorum 6 q. 14, f. 129vb: “Hec autem que dicta sunt in
hiis opinionibus forte magis speculabilia sunt quam pertineant ad istam scientiam; sunt
etiam multum generalia; sicut autem dicitur secundo huius sermones quidem univer-
sales inaniores sunt, particulares vero veriores. Idcirco magis particulariter oportet de
hiis perscrutari”.
68 Ibid., f. 130ra: “… propter quod manifestum est quod iste prudentie idem habitus
sunt et non alius secundum rem: illo enim habitu et illa operatione quo vel qua aliis
procuramus bona, eodem habitu et eadem operatione nobis bonum virtutis acquirimus.
“Esse tamen non idem ipsis—ut dicit Aristoteles—id est ille habitus idem existens
secundum rem diuersiﬁcari potest secundum rationem”.
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devoted to one’s own good, but in the fact that it focusses on the wrong
kind of goods: material goods do not allow for a compatibility between
the interests of the individual and the common good.69
From this point of view, Buridan’s defence of the unity of prudence
appears to reﬂect social prejudice, although it is most likely that vulgus
has a moral rather than a sociological connotation. This interpretation
can be conﬁrmed by Buridan’s treatment of the following question,
which had also been raised by Henry of Friemar: utrum prudentia politica
et prudentia legipositiva sint idem habitus. In this context, where prudentia
politica signiﬁes precisely an aspect of political prudence that can be
distinguished from legispositiva, a question arises about the relationship
between the ruler and the subjects. Buridan refuses to consider them as
essentially diﬀerent, arguing that if the opposite were true, then losing
or acquiring power would aﬀect the virtue of a human being. Relying
on a lengthy quotation from Seneca, Buridan rejects as untenable
such a conclusion.70 The very existence of doctores moralium such as
Seneca and Cicero, who taught princes how to legislate and taught
their subjects as well, shows, according to the Parisian master, the unity
of prudence.71 Princes and subjects, shoemakers and sailors, the rich
and the poor, all share the same virtue.72 The answer could be diﬀerent
only if ‘prudence’ meant the ability to perform external actions that are
proper to some social or political position. Only if taken in this sense
would the prudence of the ruler not be the same as the prudence of his
subjects.73
69 Ibid.: “Hec autem opinio in hoc verum assumit quod prudentia monostica que est
vere et simpliciter prudentia consistit in bene consiliari posse et operari ad acquirenda
sibipsi bona, sed errat in hoc, quod credat bona corporis et exteriora esse bona
simpliciter et optima; prudens igitur simpliciter non nititur sibi diuitias acquirere”.
70 Ibid. q. 15, f. 130va: “Item si alia esset prudentia legislatoris et subditi, sequeretur
quod fortuna de prudente faceret imprudentem et e converso; consequens est falsum,
unde Seneca ad Lucillium epistula subinde dicit ‘sapiens quidem, id est prudens, vincit
virtute fortunam’”. On Seneca’s importance for Buridan, see James J. Walsh, “Buridan
and Seneca”, Journal of the History of Ideas 27 (1966), 23–40.
71 Ibid. f. 130vb: “Iterum hoc manifeste potest apparere si aspexerimus ad antiquos
patres, Aristoteles, Senecam, Tullium et ceteros moralium doctores, qui et principes et
subditos prudenter docuerunt et principum consules fuerunt ad ponendum leges, quod
non fuisset si non habuissent prudentiam hanc et aliam”.
72 Ibid.: “Cum ergo diximus eandem esse prudentiam principis et subditi et cuius-
cumque viri locuti sumus de prudentia simpliciter secundum quam habens dicitur
bonus homo, sic scilicet intelligendo quod Sortes eadem prudentia erit bonus homo
si fuerit princeps et si fuerit subditus et si dives et si pauper et si coriarius et si nauta et
si carpentator et universaliter ad quemcumque statum pervenerit sed bonum”.
73 Ibid., f. 131ra.
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The fourth and last question devoted by Buridan to this cluster
of problems bears the title utrum prudentia sit idem habitus cum scientia
morali tradita in libro ethicorum, politicorum et economicorum et etiam in lib-
ris legum et decretorum.74 Here Buridan discusses in detail a distinction
that already emerged in Aquinas’s and in Henry of Friemar’s commen-
taries,75 namely the distinction between politica as a habitus scientiﬁcus (a
set of cognitions) and politica as a prudentia that is not a mere knowledge
concerning action, but a moral disposition of the soul. In the ﬁrst place,
Buridan rejects a solution according to which the diﬀerence between
science and prudence can be reduced to the circumstance that habitus
scientiﬁci concern the universal, prudence, on the contrary, the singular.
In his opinion, prudence does consist of what he calls universal propo-
sitions: their diﬀerence from the propositions proper to metaphysics or
physics does not consist in their universality or lack of it, but in in
their capacity to guide our actions. Prudence contains therefore a set of
propositions, be they in the form of self-evident ﬁrst principles or con-
clusions drawn from those principles. This position allows him to main-
tain that the content of the books of the scientia moralis does not diﬀer
essentially from prudence.76 In this way, Buridan stresses again the unity
of prudence, also with respect to knowledge concerning moral action;
yet at the same time he implicitly raises the question of wicked persons
who know moral principles perfectly but do not act correctly. How-
ever, whether Buridan can be regarded as an ‘ethical intellectualist’ is a
problem beyond the limits of the present paper.77
74 Ibid. q. 17, ﬀ. 132va–133va.
75 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Ethicorum 6.7, p. 357: “… omnia ergo de quibus hic
ﬁt mentio in tantum sunt species prudentiae in quantum non in ratione sola consistunt,
sed habent aliquid in appetitu; in quantum enim sunt in sola ratione, dicuntur quedam
scientiae practicae, scilicet ethica, yconomica et politica”.
76 John Buridan, Super libros Ethicorum 6 q. 17, f. 133va: “videtur mihi quod habitus
acquisitus ex doctrina librorum legum, decretorum et universaliter librorum moralium
pertinet ad prudentiam, ita quod prudentia si sit perfecta continet in se habitum
illum vel consimilem tanquam partem quandam ipsius, quoniam prudentia non est
alius habitus quam secundum quem scimus quid et quomodo sit agendum ad bene
vivendum et feliciter…”.
77 Ibid.: “… nulli praui sciunt conclusiones ymo neque principia illorum librorum,
licet enim bene sciant quid in illis libris scriptum sit et quid preceptum et quid
prohibitum, tamen neque conclusionibus neque principiis neque huiusmodi preceptis
nec prohibitionibusacquiescunt secundum mentem interiorem”. On the problem of
ethical intellectualism see recently István Bejczy, “Ethique et connaissance au moyen
âge: La vertu entre intellectualisme et volontarisme”, in Etica e conoscenza nel XIII e XIV
secolo, ed. Irene Zavattero (Arezzo, 2006), 9–13.
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Conclusion
Looking back over the development described in this brief survey, one
can see the ‘history’ of political prudence from the Latin Eustratius to
Buridan as a telling example of the creativity of the medieval com-
mentary tradition on the Nicomachean Ethics. The expression prudentia
politica, which does not surface as such in the Latin translation of the
Nicomachean Ethics becomes, thanks to Eustratius’s mediating role, a key
concept in medieval Latin commentaries on chapter 6.8. In this pro-
cess, prudentia politica assumes two diﬀerent meanings: in a general sense,
it designates prudence concerned with the good of the community; in
a more speciﬁc one, the prudence of the individual as a subject or
ordinary citizen in a political community. In the latter case, political
prudence is opposed to the legislative prudence attributed especially to
the rulers. Commentators discuss the relationship between this kind of
prudence and other aspects of the same virtue. In such discussions we
perceive also a distinct echo of diﬀerent political tendencies. Giles of
Rome’s De regimine principum supports without any diﬃculty the idea of
a clear-cut distinction between the prudence of the ruler and that of
the subjects, while other authors are more concerned to safeguard the
moral legitimacy of elections.
No commentary that I have examined is ready to accept the idea of
a complete separation between individual ethics and politics. The fact
itself, however, that even critics of Aquinas’s solution use the concept
of prudentia politica in its diﬀerent meanings, shows that the notion of
diﬀerent, albeit related, ‘spheres’ of ethical activity could gain ground
in the medieval reception of the Nicomachean Ethics.
